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Now several factors have stimulated renewed interest 
in fertilizer subsidies in Africa. The fertilizer and seed 
subsidy program of the government of Malawi is credited 
with contributing to significant increases in that country’s 
maize harvest. African policymakers came together in 
2006 at the African Fertilizer Summit and resolved that 
member states should grant “targeted subsidies in favor 
of the fertilizer sector.”2 Both the Millennium Villages 
program, guided by economist Jeffrey Sachs, and the 
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa have in recent 
years called for governments to boost fertilizer use in 
Africa, with subsidies if necessary.3 Finally, the global food 
crisis of 2007–08 highlighted the importance of boosting 
agricultural production. Increased fertilizer uptake is 
an important component in raising crop yields on the 
continent—on average, farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa use 
about 13 kilograms (kg) of fertilizer nutrients per hectare 
(ha) of arable land compared with the developing-country 
average of 94 kg/ha.4
Yet fertilizer subsidies remain controversial. Many 
development economists and international development 
agencies point to the high cost and limited effectiveness 
of fertilizer subsidies in the 1970s and 1980s. They 
note that past subsidy programs, which often involved 
state monopolies in fertilizer marketing, undermined 
the emergence of efficient, widespread, private input 
distribution networks. Moreover, there are significant 
opportunity costs to devoting public funds to subsidizing 
fertilizer rather than investing in market development, 
agricultural research, transportation infrastructure, or other 
public goods to achieve a country’s development goals.5 
Proponents of subsidies believe, however, that 
fertilizer subsidies are the only way to jump-start 
African agriculture and deliver concrete food security 
and income benefits to the rural poor. Agronomists see 
such subsidies as a way of reversing the depletion of soil 
nutrients in Sub-Saharan Africa. Political leaders often 
view fertilizer subsidies as a simple way to quickly assist 
rural households. And some development agencies see 
them as central to achieving a Green Revolution in Africa. 
These proponents argue that governments can 
avoid the mistakes of the past by implementing “smart 
subsidies,” which are designed to target the poor and 
to support, rather than undercut, the development of 
private input distribution markets. Input vouchers have 
been proposed as a way to make fertilizer subsidies 
“smart.” Nonetheless, such schemes are not appropriate 
or cost-effective in all situations. It is important to 
clarify the conditions under which fertilizer subsidies and 
vouchers make sense.
TradiTional   Fertilizer SubSidieS 
Many African smallholder farmers seem to use much less 
fertilizer than is economically optimal.6  They may use too 
little fertilizer because they lack information on how to 
use fertilizer effectively and profitably, because they are 
risk averse in the face of uncertain rainfall, or because 
they lack the cash to pay for it because of low income and 
poorly functioning credit markets. In areas with sparse or 
sporadic demand, retailers will not find it worthwhile to 
stock fertilizer, resulting in a collapse of the local fertilizer 
supply. If subsidies help farmers offset these constraints 
and reach optimal application rates such that the addition-
al farm income exceeds the cost of the subsidy program, 
they can be justified on efficiency grounds. Alternatively, if 
fertilizer subsidies are a cost-effective way of assisting the 
rural poor, they can be justified on equity grounds. 
i
n the 1970s and 1980s, most African countries sold fertilizer at subsidized prices 
through state-owned enterprises. in response to the fiscal cost and ineffective 
implementation of these subsidies, as well as pressure from international financial 
institutions, almost all of these countries liberalized their fertilizer markets to some 
degree as part of structural adjustment programs carried out in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. under these reforms, governments eliminated state monopolies on fertilizer 




















































































































































































































Figure 1—Fertilizer use in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1961–2007 
Based on these arguments, as well as general suspicion 
of markets, most African governments tightly controlled 
their fertilizer markets in the 1970s and 1980s. Typically, 
one or more state-owned entities had a legal monopoly 
on importing and distributing fertilizer. Fertilizer prices 
were subsidized at below-market levels and fixed at one 
rate throughout the country. The fertilizer was often 
distributed as part of government-run agricultural credit 
schemes, and a large percentage of the fertilizer was 
provided by donor agencies as in-kind aid.7 
These policies, however, resulted in high financial costs 
and inefficient distribution. Fertilizer was often delivered 
to farmers late and in limited quantities. Although 
fertilizer subsidies were politically popular, economists 
and policymakers began to believe that the fiscal cost 
was not worth the benefits to farmers. In addition, 
growing evidence showed that the bulk of the benefits of 
these subsidies went to larger and richer farmers, thus 
undercutting the equity argument for subsidies.8 Under 
the structural adjustment programs of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, most African 
countries phased out fertilizer subsidies and opened up 
fertilizer markets to competition from the private sector 
as part of wider market reforms in the economy. 
The link between fertilizer policy and fertilizer use 
in Africa is not very direct.  According to the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 
annual growth in fertilizer use in Sub-Saharan Africa was 
9 percent over the 1960s and 1970s, but since 1981 
fertilizer use has stagnated at around 1.9–2.2 million 
metric tons, with some possible signs of growth since 
2000 (see Figure 1). Given that few countries had begun 
to liberalize their fertilizer markets by 1981, it is difficult 
to attribute this stagnation to the reforms. In some 
countries, subsidy removal and devaluation resulted in 
sharp reductions in fertilizer use (Cameroon, Ghana, 
3
Source: FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2009. FAOStat. http://faostat.fao.org/site/422/default.aspx#ancor. Accessed July 15, 2009.
Note: Data refer to the 33 countries for which data exist in both old and new FAO fertilizer data series. These countries represent 98 percent of fertilizer use in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.Nigeria, Senegal, and Tanzania), whereas in other countries 
fertilizer use actually increased (Benin, Madagascar, Mali, 
and Togo). This finding implies that fertilizer policy is only 
one factor affecting fertilizer prices and that fertilizer 
prices are one of several determinants of fertilizer use.9
FerTilizer   Market developMent
  prograMS 
Fertilizer market development is an alternative approach 
to improving farmers’ access to fertilizer that has become 
more common over the past 10–15 years. This strategy 
involves improving the policy environment, strengthening 
and expanding the network of private agro-input dealers 
with training and credit, and providing farmers with 
information about fertilizer use through advisory services 
and demonstration plots.
A key policy issue, therefore, is whether direct 
subsidies on fertilizer to small farmers are as effective 
in building sustained improved access to fertilizer as, for 
example, support to intermediate actors in the fertilizer 
supply chain or better information for farmers on how to 
make productive use of fertilizer. The answer seems to be, 
it depends. If farmers have reasonable access to cash or 
credit, then it is more effective to support the fertilizer 
supply chain than farmers directly. Evidence of this 
finding comes from Kenya, which has relatively effective 
smallholder credit provision and higher household cash 
incomes than do many other countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. A stable fertilizer policy environment in Kenya 
supported increasing investment in fertilizer marketing at 
all levels from importers to retailers. The number of rural 
stockists of fertilizer increased sharply, and the increasingly 
competitive fertilizer sector worked to reduce its 
transaction costs, giving farmers more incentives to 
use fertilizer. Moreover, fertilizer dealers tailored their 
products to farmers’ needs. For example, they offered 
small, experimental packets of improved seed and fertilizer 
for farmers with only a little cash. A sustainable fertilizer 
supply system within the private sector is emerging with 
minimal direct delivery of subsidies to farmers.10
Even with the success achieved in Kenya, however, the 
economics of profitable fertilizer use still apply—fertilizer 
use remains limited in remote agricultural areas of the 
country where high transport costs render farmgate 
crop prices too low and costs of fertilizer are too high to 
allow its profitable use. The economically optimal fertilizer 
application rate in such areas is zero. As in many other 
remote areas of Sub-Saharan Africa, other investments 
than fertilizer subsidies, such as agricultural technologies 
appropriate for local economic conditions or improved 
roads and communication services to foster market 
development, would make greater contributions to the 
welfare of farm households in such areas.
SmarT   SubSidieS and input
  voucherS
Could past problems with fertilizer subsidies stem from 
how the fertilizer was provided to farmers? Some suggest 
that new ways of designing subsidy programs may help 
avoid past mistakes. Smart subsidies are mechanisms to 
provide subsidized goods and services designed both to 
promote market development and to enhance the welfare 
of the poor. Below-market-cost provision of goods and 
services, generally by private-sector suppliers, from which 
the poor in particular are likely to benefit, can be consid-
ered smart subsidies. For example, provision of foot-driv-
en irrigation pumps or small seed and fertilizer packages 
and the creation of local schemes to exchange breeding 
animals among farmers with small herds could all qualify as 
smart subsidy interventions. The subsidies can be phased 
out once the market infrastructure has been developed 
and markets are functioning. 
A common approach to designing smart subsidies for 
fertilizer use involves input vouchers. The idea is simple. 
Farmers are given vouchers that they can take to local, of-
ten small-scale, private input suppliers to acquire fertilizer 
(or seed or pesticides). The cost of the fertilizer for the 
farmer is reduced by the value of the voucher. The suppli-
er, having provided fertilizer to the farmer in exchange for 
the voucher and any additional cash cost beyond the value 
of the voucher, takes the voucher to a bank or other des-
ignated agency and is reimbursed for its value, plus a han-
dling fee. The voucher is an income transfer to the farmer 
from the government, donor, or implementing agency, but 
it is a transfer that can be realized only through private-
sector suppliers. For input suppliers, the vouchers are a 
way to guarantee demand (and a profit margin) for the 
fertilizer that they supply, potentially enabling them to cap-
ture economies of scale in their business, reducing some 
of their risk, and contributing to setting their business on 
a sound financial footing.11 
In theory, input vouchers have a number of advantages 
4over direct government in-kind provision of subsidized 
fertilizer to farmers, interventions affecting the entire 
national fertilizer market, or other forms of subsidies on 
fertilizer:
Vouchers can help build the private-sector  • 
distribution network by requiring that farmers 
take their vouchers to private input dealers to 
exchange for fertilizer.
Voucher programs can build exit strategies by  • 
reducing the value of the voucher over time or 
converting it to a crop production credit that is 
repaid at harvest.
Voucher programs provide an opportunity to train  • 
farmers and input suppliers on efficient, profitable 
use of fertilizer.
In emergency response situations, vouchers can  • 
replace food aid as medium-term support to 
those affected.
Input vouchers also have disadvantages, however, 
depending on how they are implemented:
Administrative costs can be high, particularly if the  • 
government attempts to target certain types of 
households, such as small farmers.  
Vouchers may leak out of the target group if  • 
the intended beneficiaries resell the vouchers 
to others. Although the targeted group benefits 
from the cash income, leakage defeats the goal of 
boosting their agricultural productivity.  
The use of vouchers to acquire fertilizer may  • 
displace some purchases of fertilizer that the 
voucher recipient would have made with his or 
her own resources, thereby undercutting efforts 
to develop a sustainable private-sector input 
supply system. 
Fertilizer vouchers are of value only to farmers  • 
that grow crops that are responsive to fertilizer 
and that live close enough to an input supplier to 
make the transaction worthwhile. 
For voucher programs to promote input  • 
market development, the vouchers need to be 
redeemable at private input dealers. Voucher 
programs that involve only government suppliers 
of fertilizer or only selected private dealers 
weaken the private distribution network. 
Finally, to promote input market development, the  • 
voucher programs need to be in place for 5 to 10 
years. One-time voucher programs are likely to 
retard rather than enhance market development 
and result in less efficient use of fertilizer by 
farmers. Longer-term programs, however, do not 
match government and donor funding cycles, so 
they are often difficult to sustain.
inpuT   voucherS in practice
Malawi’s voucher program is the largest and the one 
most often cited as a smart subsidy success story. Malawi 
eliminated universal fertilizer subsidies for smallholders 
in the mid-1990s, but it reintroduced limited subsidies in 
1998 through the Starter Pack program, which gave all 
farmers, free of charge, 10–15 kg of fertilizer and enough 
improved seed to plant 0.1 ha. After two years, this 
program was converted into the Targeted Input Program 
(TIP), which distributed the packs to a targeted group of 
farmers, with the percentage of all farming households 
in Malawi targeted varying between 33 and 96 percent, 
depending on the year.12
In 2005, the program was redesigned as the 
Agricultural Inputs Subsidy Program (AISP), a voucher-
based universal subsidy program that allows farmers to 
buy 100 kg of fertilizer at about one-fifth of the market 
price, thus dramatically increasing both the quantity 
of fertilizer being subsidized and the fiscal cost of the 
subsidy. The combination of increased fertilizer use and 
good rainfall has resulted in substantially increased maize 
production over the past few years, leading to improved 
food security and even some maize exports. 
Vouchers have been used in Malawi fertilizer programs 
since the TIP in 2000, but the distribution of the subsidized 
inputs has been managed largely by two state-owned 
enterprises. Private importers are contracted to deliver 
the subsidized fertilizer to distribution points, but private 
agro-input dealers have generally not been involved in 
distribution. Under the TIP program, these dealers still 
maintained a large market share because the subsidized 
fertilizer accounted for just 9–24 percent of the total 
fertilizer market in Malawi. With the AISP, however, the 
proportion of subsidized fertilizer has increased to about 
half and the market share of private input distributors 
has fallen to 58 percent. Although the government 
experimented with allowing fertilizer vouchers to be 
redeemed at private distributors, this effort has been 
56
discontinued because of allegations of misuse of the 
vouchers. The theoretical virtues of input vouchers as a 
smart subsidy to strengthen private input supply networks 
are thus negated by the way the AISP is implemented.13 
In 2006–07, the total cost of the AISP was US$91 
million, representing 45 percent of the budget of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security and 5.2 percent 
of the national budget. An evaluation of the AISP estimated 
that the benefits in terms of additional maize production 
were between 76 and 136 percent of the costs, leaving 
it ambiguous whether the program can be justified on 
efficiency grounds.14 Since then, the cost of the program 
has expanded to more than US$200 million, largely 
because of the rise in international fertilizer prices.15 
The AISP is widely seen as a success among African 
policymakers. Based on Malawi’s success in stimulating 
maize output, a number of countries, including Ghana, 
Kenya, and Tanzania, have launched voucher-based fertilizer 
subsidies, and others, like Zambia, are considering such 
programs. In Tanzania, the government used to subsidize 
the transportation of fertilizer to remote regions of the 
country. Starting in 2008, it redesigned the program as a 
voucher-based subsidy, in which farmers receive vouchers 
for 100 kg of fertilizer, other agrochemicals, seed, and 
seedlings, redeemable at any private agro-input dealer. 
With support from the World Bank, this program is 
being scaled up to reach 1.5 million beneficiaries.16 Kenya 
launched a similar program in 2006, though on a smaller 
scale. Ghana initiated a voucher-based fertilizer subsidy 
in 2008 in response to the sharp rise in fertilizer prices. 
Distributors affiliated with the fertilizer importers were 
allowed to participate, but independent dealers were 
excluded from participation.17 
Based on the limited experience to date, voucher-
based fertilizer subsidy systems are not immune to some 
of the problems that plagued the universal fertilizer 
subsidy programs in the 1970s and 1980s. One example 
is late delivery of fertilizer. In 2004–05, Malawian farmers 
held off buying fertilizer in expectation of a large subsidy, 
but delays in the decisionmaking and budgeting process 
meant that the subsidized fertilizer arrived too late for 
many farmers. Ghana had a similar experience in 2008. 
Another example is the displacement of private-
sector dealers, which has occurred in Ghana and Malawi 
to varying degrees.18 In this respect, the Tanzania voucher 
program appears to be more successful in promoting the 
development of a private distribution network. It remains 
to be seen if these implementation problems can be 
corrected as the programs mature or if they are inherent 
problems associated with public-sector involvement in 
fertilizer distribution.
iSSueS in    iMpleMenting input
  voucherS
Input vouchers may well be the best instrument to 
attain the objectives of a particular public program 
for agriculture and rural development, but this result 
cannot be assumed. The specific design and quality of 
implementation are critical to success. It is important to 
address three broad issues when considering fertilizer 
input vouchers: 
the objectives of the intervention. 1.   Input voucher 
programs are typically saddled with several objectives. 
The most prominent are developing the private input 
supply system, reducing poverty, and attaining national 
or household food security, but others may include 
accelerating technology transfer and helping provide 
a social safety net for the poorest members of rural 
communities. It is not realistic to expect, however, that 
a single program can succeed in achieving multiple 
objectives in a sustainable way. Prioritized objectives 
are needed for any input voucher program.
the effectiveness of targeting and the potential  2. 
for leakage. Ensuring that the benefits of an input 
voucher program go to the designated beneficiaries is 
a challenge. An evaluation of the TIP in Malawi, which 
relied on community-based targeting using poverty 
criteria, found that the beneficiaries were no poorer 
on average than non-beneficiaries. Lack of information, 
political interference, and implementation constraints, 
such as insufficient time in the face of coming rains or 
poor voucher control systems, all reduce the efficiency 
of targeting of the vouchers.  
 
Although various program designs offer partial 
solutions to the problem of targeting, a more 
fundamental question is whether targeting matters. 
The answer depends on the objectives of the program. 
If the principal aim of the program is to develop the 
input supply system, then it may not matter whether 
the person who redeems the vouchers is a targeted 
farmer or not. In contrast, if poverty reduction 
or household food security is the focus, then it is 7
important to target the poor or food insecure. Yet, 
from a poverty reduction standpoint, the formation of 
a secondary market in vouchers does not necessarily 
indicate a flawed program, so long as the vouchers 
initially were provided to poor farmers. 
the appropriateness of focusing on fertilizer. 3.   
If the objective of an intervention is to strengthen 
private input supply systems, fertilizer vouchers 
that can be redeemed at private input suppliers 
make sense. They provide incentives to farmers to 
use fertilizer and create effective demand to which 
suppliers will respond. When vouchers are used 
to reduce poverty or strengthen social safety nets, 
however, the rationale for providing vouchers rather 
than cash transfers or public goods and services is 
less clear. There are significant opportunity costs 
in devoting resources to the supply of fertilizer, a 
private good, at the expense of public goods that may 
have higher returns in terms of growth and poverty 
reduction. 
are VoucherS     the anSwer? 
Historically, African smallholder farmers managed the 
fertility of their croplands mainly by leaving fields in fallow 
regularly and, in some regions, by applying animal manure. 
In many important agricultural areas, however, increasing 
rural population densities are reducing the land available 
for crops and pasture, posing challenges for both of 
these approaches to soil fertility management. As such, 
significantly greater use of inorganic fertilizer will be an 
increasingly important factor to ensure that farmers in 
Africa are able to farm profitably and to boost production 
to meet the food needs of the continent. Enabling farmers 
to expand their use of inorganic fertilizer is a key challenge 
facing African governments. The evidence is fairly clear 
that the fertilizer subsidies governments implemented 
in the 1970s and 1980s had a high fiscal cost, largely 
displaced private-sector input distribution systems, and 
were not very effective in stimulating output or assisting 
the poor.19  The current debate revolves around the 
question of whether better-designed fertilizer subsidy 
schemes could achieve some of the objectives of the older 
programs—namely, increased productivity and reduced 
rural poverty—without their attendant high costs and 
adverse side effects.
Fertilizer subsidies are most likely to be a good 
option when farmers are not familiar with the benefits of 
fertilizer, when there is demonstrated profitability and low 
adoption, when the subsidies can be targeted to the poor, 
and when the input distribution network is dense enough 
to allow an input voucher system to work. 
Targeting fertilizer subsidies can reduce the cost and 
make the subsidy more pro-poor, but the experience 
with administrative targeting of poor households has not 
been encouraging.20 One effective way to target poor 
households is to offer free or subsidized inputs of a limited 
quantity, where the quantity is small enough to interest 
small farmers but not larger farmers. Another approach to 
targeting is to provide fertilizer in exchange for providing 
labor to public works, which will interest poor households 
more than their better-off neighbors. Both of these 
approaches can be implemented with input vouchers.
There appears to be agreement that, where fertilizer 
subsidies are implemented, input vouchers are preferable 
to direct state distribution of fertilizer. The use of input 
vouchers promises to stimulate the development of 
a private-sector input supply chain. The experience 
of Malawi demonstrates, however, that voucher-based 
subsidies do not necessarily promote the development of 
private distributors. Experience to date with vouchers is 
too thin to consider them a “proven” success. Rigorous 
impact evaluations of input voucher schemes are needed 
to determine whether the value of additional crop 
production resulting from the subsidy exceeds the full 
cost of the program. Of course, the ultimate objective 
is improving welfare and nutrition, but if an input 
subsidy cannot generate additional crop output whose 
value exceeds the program costs, then investments in 
agricultural research or food and nutrition programs are 
likely to have a greater impact on welfare and nutrition. 
For development objectives that go beyond 
strengthening input markets and enhancing farmers’ ability 
to use inputs effectively, the value of input vouchers is less 
clear. In particular, vouchers appear to be a poor choice 
for attaining social safety net and poverty reduction 
objectives, even in rural farming communities, particularly if 
they are implemented in an inconsistent manner. There are 
significant opportunity costs in devoting significant public 
resources to the supply of fertilizer, a private good, at the 
expense of public goods such as infrastructure, education, 
or public health services that may have greater impact in 
reducing poverty.
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nOteS:
Among the most effective options for reducing the farm-
level cost of fertilizer or increasing the yield response are 
agronomic research on how crop yields respond to the 
application of fertilizer, economic research on fertilizer use 
and distribution costs, market development programs, and 
pilot programs with built-in impact assessment.
Finally, the evidence shows that a fertilizer subsidy 
program, even a well-designed one, cannot substitute for a 
broad-based program of public investment in agricultural 
research and extension and in infrastructure development, 
particularly roads, combined with a policy environment 
that facilitates private-sector development.